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Argument Priority 
Classification: 14b 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of this appeal 
is vested pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (i) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure [hereinafter U.R.C.P.]. The case history recited 
by Appellants under the heading "Statement of the Case", found in 
Appellants1 brief [hereinafter AB] at pages one through four, is, 
by and large, accurate insofar as it comprises a basic chrono-
logical recapitulation of the pleadings found in the record on 
appeal. As a result, no additional statement need be added here. 
(See Rule 24(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondents believe the following issues constitute the 
appropriate scope of judicial review in the instant case: 
I.Appropriate standards of appellate review compel the affirmation 
of the trial court's judgment; this affirmation is further com-
pelled by an examination of the credibility of Appellant Crane. 
II. No agreement was ever timely reached between the parties; the 
mail-box rule is inapplicable in the instant case. 
III. Respondents' offer was effectively withdrawn on February 22, 
1985. 
IV. Appellants' acceptance of Respondents' offer was conditional 
and constituted little more than a counteroffer. 
V. Equity compelled that Appellants not prevail in the instant 
suit. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Where necessary, Respondents shall cite to appropriate 
constitutional and statutory provisions within the body of the 
brief and will quote the same, unless otherwise noted, in their 
entirety. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants' brief properly recites the chronology of the 
case. (See AB "Statement of the Case" at 1-4.) Furthermore, the 
following two paragraphs, once again excerpted from Appellants' 
brief, accurately identify the nominal parties in this case: 
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TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, is a Utah limited 
partnership which is in the business of real 
estate development and sales in southern Utah. 
HEART MARKETING, is a Utah corporation which 
serves as general or managing partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE. LEISURE SPORTS, is also 
a Utah corporation. Mr. Barry Church is the 
President of HEART MARKETING as well as 
LEISURE SPORTS. Mr. Russell Gallian is a 
shareholder of LEISURE SPORTS. 
CLIFFORD CRANE, is a limited partner of 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, owning twenty-five per-
cent (25%) of the partnership interest. (AB 
at 4, citations omitted) 
In addition to the above, Russell J. Gallian, Esq. 
[hereinafter Gallian], was at all relevant times Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of Leisure Sports, Inc. [hereinafter Leisure 
Sports] and also acted in the capacity of its attorney. 
Dixie Title Company [hereinafter Dixie Title] was the 
designated escrow agent for depository purposes in reference to 
the initial offer by Timberbrook Village, Ltd. [hereinafter 
Timberbrook] to purchase the limited partnership interest held by 
Clifford G. Crane [hereinafter Crane]. Doug Westbrook is the 
Manager of Dixie Title Company. Bonnie Crane is the wife of 
Clifford Crane. 
The foregoing appropriately identifies the named parties 
and, where applicable, their principals and agents. This summation 
is perhaps necessary so that the varying interests of those who 
have given testimony in this case may be appropriately identified 
throughout the transcript of the two-day trial. All parties have 
been properly joined. 
As the basic overview of the facts in this case may be 
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gleaned from the reporter's transcript of Judge Eves1 ruling 
coupled with the executed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
themselves, Respondents have attached these documents in the 
appendix as Addendums "1" and "2," respectively. (Cf.. R at 332, 
305-15) For purposes of this appeal, however, Respondents believe 
that the core of the trial court's judgment, appended hereto, is 
bottomed in the testimony of four people, three of whom are 
attorneys. 
Timberbrook, throughout all relevant times herein, was 
represented by Mr. Russell Gallian, who also served as the Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of Leisure Sports, the proposed purchaser 
of Crane's interest in Timberbrook. Crane was represented at all 
relevant times by Mr. Dean Mixon, Esq., a California attorney, 
whose deposition was taken at his offices and published for 
purposes of trial. (D-29) In Utah, Crane was represented by Mr. 
Willard R. Bishop, Esq. 
As the trial court's primary function below was to weigh 
the veracity of those testifying before it, it is important to note 
that in those particular and peculiar aspects of Crane's testimony 
where his attorneys might otherwise have verified or corroborated 
his statements, their testimony ran at odds thereto. This point 
is more particularly set forth as part of Argument I, infra. 
Indeed, Crane's attorneys not only corroborated the testimony of 
Mr. Gallian, but provided, by means of impeachment, a substantial 
basis from which the trial court could readily disregard all of the 
material testimony proffered by Crane. With the foregoing in mind, 
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the following facts appear probative to the trial court's decision 
in favor of Respondents. 
* * * 
Prior to 1984, Appellant Clifford Crane purchased a 25% 
interest in Timberbrook. (Finding of Fact No. 2) In late 1984, 
Leisure Sports and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., the 
general partner of Timberbrook, desired to repurchase the interest 
of Crane in said partnership. (Finding of Fact No. 3) As of 
November 13, 1984, Timberbrook and Crane had reached in principle 
an oral agreement which, to be valid and enforceable, was to be 
reduced to writing, signed by the Cranes, and deposited by them at 
Dixie Title along with executed assignments of their partnership 
interests. These requirements were expressly necessary to complete 
the transaction. (Finding of Fact No. 4) Indeed, as forwarded to 
the Cranes by Gallian on behalf of Leisure Sports, the proposals 
to purchase Appellants' partnership interest had already been 
signed in good faith by the principals of Leisure Sports. (See P-
7, P-8, and P-9.) 
No consideration had been tendered by Crane in exchange 
for the offer to purchase his interest, nor for the drafting or 
transmittal of these documents. As set forth, the documents 
propose an exchange of Crane's limited partnership interest for 
$175,000.00 in cash, and unit 210 in building 1 of Timberbrook 
Condominiums. (P-8 and P-9) The agreement and closing thereon 
were expressly made contingent on Crane's execution and delivery 
to Dixie Title of these documents. (Finding of Fact No. 7) 
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Indeed, both Exhibits P-8 and P-9 expressly dictate to Crane that 
the assignment of his limited partnership interest "shall be 
deposited with escrow agent to be delivered to buyer upon closing.11 
(See P-8 and P-9; cf. Finding of Fact No. 7.) 
Since this exchange contemplated both the transfer of 
monies and title to a condominium, the matters fell squarely within 
Utah's statute of frauds, found in Title 25 of the Utah Code. As 
of November 20, 1984, Respondents had already caused to be placed 
in escrow $175,000.00, and Mr. Gallian had further obtained, as 
required by P-8 and P-9, the release of Appellants from a loan 
guarantee earlier executed by Appellants. (See P-6; cf. P-14.) 
As stated by Judge Eves at R. 332 at 3, however, "[s]ome of those 
items had not been discussed nor settled in the oral agreement." 
(Id., emphasis added) 
After Crane returned to California, he became dissat-
isfied with the $175,000.00 or the monetary element of Respondents1 
offer and retained Mr. Mixon, his California attorney. (Deposition 
of Dean Mixon, D-29 at 16, 30, and 31 [hereinafter Mixon]) Mr. 
Mixon initially contacted Gallian on January 4, 1985. His "sole 
purpose in the phone call was to try to get additional money out 
of the buyer." (Mixon at 32) This call occurred at 3:01 in the 
afternoon and lasted for ten minutes. Immediately thereafter, 
Mixon spoke to Crane for 15 minutes, and one minute later to 
Attorney Hans Chamberlain, of Cedar City, Utah, for five minutes. 
One minute thereafter, Mixon contacted Mr. Willard Bishop, Appel-
lants' counsel. Crane subsequently retained Bishop to seek a 
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complete accounting from Timberbrook, ultimately initiating a 
lawsuit through Bishop's office for this purpose. The trial court 
took judicial notice of this suit, filed in Iron County, Civil No. 
85-066. (Reporter's Transcript August 4, 1987, at 42 [hereinafter 
Tl]; see also phone records of Dean Mixon, page 6, for January 17, 
1985, appended to Mixon deposition D-29.) Mixonfs phone records 
further show that he had no further contact with Bishop through 
March 16, 1985. Pursuing Appellants' suit for an accounting, 
Bishop forwarded letters, with the express written authorization 
of Mr. Crane attached thereto, requesting a comprehensive account-
ing of the limited partnership pursuant to Section 48-2-10 of the 
Utah Code. (P-10-A and P-ll-A) 
Meanwhile, Mixon continued his efforts to "up the price11 
in Respondents' offer to purchase Crane's interest previously 
received in November, though Bishop was totally unaware of this 
offer! (Mixon at 16, 30, 31, 32, 44, and 47) Gallian expressly 
confirmed Mixon's testimony at trial. (Tl at 261-62) 
Bishop ultimately filed his suit for an accounting on 
February 12, 1985. On the 13th of February, he received P-13, a 
letter drafted by Gallian and directed to Bishop in response to 
Bishop's earlier letters. (P-10-A and P-ll-A) When Bishop 
received this letter, he was as yet uninformed that Mixon was 
negotiating in California for the sale of Crane's partnership 
interest to Respondents. (Tl at 248) Gallian still assumed that 
the various problems with Crane had been solved. (P-13) After 
receiving Gallian's letter on February 13, 1985, Bishop telephoned 
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Crane. Judge Eves expressly found that during this conversation 
with his Utah counsel on February 13, 1985, "Mr. Crane told Mr. 
Bishop that he had not yet accepted the outstanding offer; that he 
wanted to go ahead with the accounting." (R 332 at 4; see also Tl 
at 249-50.) Judge Eves clearly found that these actions indicated 
that Crane "did not feel that he had a binding agreement at the 
time, but was in the position of being in receipt of an offer, 
which he was either free to accept or reject." (R 332 at 4; 
Finding of Fact No. 8) 
Upon discovering that the accounting lawsuit had been 
filed (Iron County Civil No. 85-066) on February 12, 1985, Gallian 
telephoned Bishop on February 15, 1985, expressing extreme dis-
pleasure over the status of the negotiations regarding the 
November, 1984, purchase offer. (Tl at 251, 276-77) Bishop's 
recollection of this conversation was so clear that he spontan-
eously confirmed Gallian's statement regarding the same while 
Gallian was being questioned by Mr. Hughes. (Tl 277) Bishop's 
letter of February 18, 1985, according to Bishop, correctly 
memorialized Bishop's conversation with Appellant Crane, Bishop's 
client, and, indeed, the information Bishop passed on to Gallian 
on February 15, 1985. The text of that letter is telling: 
I received your letter on 13 February 1985 and 
spoke with Mr. Clifford G. Crane on the same 
day. His information to me was that your 
people have made him an offer, but that he has 
not yet accepted it, and desires to proceed 
[with the accounting suit] until he does 
accept your settlement offer, if he does, in 
fact, accept it. (P-15-A) 
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A postscript to that letter indicates that it was dictated before 
Gallian and Bishop spoke, but the substance of their oral conversa-
tion was no different. 
Not surprisingly, Crane vehemently denied at trial that 
he hired Mixon to obtain more money, and further stated to the 
trial court that Bishop's letter of February 18, 1985, did not then 
correctly state Mr. Crane's state of mind. (See Tl at 6, 67, 69, 
71-73, 87-88, 127, 129, 131, and 138.) 
Only days before, on February 11, 1985, and simultaneous 
to the drafting of P-13 to Bishop, Gallian had sent a copy of the 
substitution of guarantor, personally certifying its authenticity, 
to Mr. Mixon. (P-12) In that letter, Gallian reaffirmed the offer 
and re-expressed the parties' understanding that Crane would 
execute the documents and that fl[u]pon receipt the escrow agent 
will disburse $175,000.00 to your clients and Barry Church will 
execute a warranty deed on behalf of the partnership for the 
condo." Gallian1s concurrent letter to Bishop, with similar 
naivete, indicated that he and Mr. Church were still "awaiting 
documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title Company, at which 
time the closing will be completed and Mr. Crane will no longer be 
associated with Timberbrook." (P-13) Both of these letters 
restated the simple condition that Crane be required to execute and 
deposit with the escrow agent Dixie Title the initial offer sent 
to Crane and received at trial as P-8 and P-9. 
On the same day that Bishop mailed Gallian his letter 
indicating Crane's nonacceptance of Respondents' offer, Mixon 
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testified that he drafted P-18, a letter to Dixie Title Company, 
enclosing the originals of P-8 and P-9, but additionally setting 
forth three conditions to the closing of the transaction. Primary 
among these conditions was a request that the escrow agent indepen-
dently receive a separate affirmation of the validity of the 
substitution of guarantor document earlier enclosed in and verified 
by Gallian's letter. (See P-12; cf. P-18.) Mixon conceded that 
his cover letter was firm and that, without dispositive proof of 
the authenticity of the substitution of guarantor, it was not 
Mixonfs intent that the deal close. (See Mixon at 22-24, 37.) 
Crane conceded that Mixon not only requested independent verifica-
tion, but an original of the substitution itself. (Tl at 146) 
Again, not unsurprisingly, Crane testified at trial, "I was not a 
party to writing those three conditions. My attorney wrote those. 
. . . We talked about it since then. We didn't talk about it 
before he wrote it, though." (Tl at 170) Crane conceded at trial, 
however, that, without independent verification of the substitu-
tion, he would not have closed. (Tl at 149) 
Initially, there was some confusion as to whether Mixon's 
letter with its contingencies and enclosures were deposited with 
Dixie Title prior to February 22, 1985. (P-18) Upon examination 
of the Dixie Title's files, however, Respondents' counsel dis-
covered the envelope from Weinfield and Mixon, which was marked as 
P-19-A. Mailed by regular domestic mail, the stamp from the Santa 
Ana, Orange County, California post office indicates a mailing in 
the p.m. of February 21, 1985. (P-19-A) Corroborative thereto, 
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at approximately 6:07 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, on February 21, 
1985, Mixon telephoned Crane at Crane's house. Mixon conceded that 
this 11-minute phone call was probably to notify Crane that Mixon 
had mailed the letter, with its enclosures, earlier in the after-
noon. (Mixon at 54-55) 
After Barry Church was served on February 13, 1985, in 
the Timberbrook accounting suit, Iron County Civil No. 85-066, and 
subsequent to Gallian's conversation with Bishop on February 15, 
1985, Gallian and Church spoke extensively, as they were together 
opening up, for President's Day weekend, a resort in southern Utah 
commonly known as Mt. Holly. (Tl at 279-80) Exasperated by 
Crane's contrary tactics, Church and Gallian decided to withdraw 
the offer to purchase Crane's interest. 
On Friday morning, February 22, 1985, Gallian received 
a phone call from Crane. Exhausted from the weekend, Gallian 
initially had failed to follow up on a personal commitment to Barry 
Church to notify Crane that the deal was off. (Tl at 276-80) And, 
though shocked at receiving telephonic contact from Crane, Gallian 
immediately advised Crane that the deal was off, testifying to the 
following: 
I answered the phone, and as he started the 
speech, I told him words to the effect, "Mr. 
Crane, before you start, I need to tell you 
that the deal is off." (Tl at 281) 
Gallian further testified that Crane never advised him 
that Mixon had mailed the documents the day before. (Tl at 282-83) 
The thrust of Gallian's statements in this conversation, however, 
11 
was unequivocal, and Gallian subsequently advised Doug Westbrook 
on the same morning at Dixie Title that the offer was no longer 
open for acceptance and that the deal was off. (Tl at 182, 185, 
195, 211, 223-25, and 283) Westbrook subsequently testified that 
Dixie Title did not receive the documents forwarded by Mixon until 
the 25th or 2 6th of February during the following week. (Tl 
at 225) Crane's initial telephone call with Gallian took three 
minutes and occurred at 11:57 a.m. Eastern Standard Time. (P-22) 
Forty minutes later, at 12:37 p.m. Eastern Standard time, Crane 
sent a mailgram (P-21) attempting to unilaterally withdraw the 
conditions set forth in Mixon's cover letter mailed February 21, 
1985. (See P-21; cf. P-18.) This initial telegram was sent only 
16 minutes after a phone call in which Gallian had further indi-
cated to Crane that he did not desire to revive or other-wise reopen 
the offer for acceptance. (Tl at 283-84; cf. P-22.) As an aid to 
this Court, Mr. Gallian1s telephone number, as set forth in 
Appellant Crane's telephone records, is (801)628-1682. 
On the 27th day of February, 1985, Crane ultimately 
phoned Gallian and threatened a suit, from which suit this appeal 
has been taken. (Tl at 289-90; P-24) Later that morning, immed-
iately after that phone call to Gallian, Crane phoned Mr. Bishop's 
office in Cedar City, Utah, at (801)586-9483. (P-24) Later that 
afternoon, just prior to 5:00 p.m. Mountain Standard Time, Crane 
once again attempted to withdraw by mailgram an additional criter-
ion of closing set forth in Mixon's letter. (P-25) A final 
mailgram allegedly waiving any other problems in the closing of 
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escrow was sent by Dean Mixon to Dixie Title on March 7, 1985. (P-
26) This suit followed. 
The trial court, having heard the testimony of all the 
parties, and, indeed, having reviewed the testimony of three 
attorneys as well as that of Mr. Crane, stated the following from 
the bench: 
On February 22, 1985 Mr. Crane called Mr. 
Gallian, and I believe that he was told at 
that time that the deal was off. As it turns 
out, however, and as you will find in a few 
minutes, it really doesn't make any differ-
ence. . . . 
Based on the testimony of Mr. Westbrook, 
Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as well as the 
postmark on the Mixon letter, I find that the 
acceptance of the sale terms had not reached 
the escrow on the morning of February 22, 
1985, but arrived after Mr. Crane had been 
told, as had Mr. Westbrook, that the deal was 
off. (R 332 at 5-6) 
Thereafter, the trial court found that the letter of 
Mixon and the contingencies stated therein, nonetheless, formed 
little more than a counteroffer which could thereafter be accepted 
or rejected by Respondents even had the documents otherwise timely 
arrived in escrow. (Findings of Fact No. 19) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The standard of review under Utah law provides that 
findings of fact entered by a trial judge shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. In light of this standard and the 
exclusive prerogative of the trial court to weigh the credibility 
of the witnesses, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to note the 
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various contradictions of Crane's testimony, particularly when 
compared to the testimony of his two attorneys. A plethora of 
evidence supports the trial court's ruling. 
II. No enforceable agreement was reached between the 
parties in a timely fashion; the mail-box rule is inapplicable. 
This follows by reason of the fact that Crane retained Mixon 
because he was dissatisfied with the monetary terms of the purchase 
offer, and further initiated a lawsuit contrary to an intent to 
sell; to-wit: the suit for accounting, Iron County Civil No. 85-
066. As the offer sent to Crane clearly set forth that acceptance 
would occur only upon deposit of the fully executed documents in 
escrow, the mail-box rule is inapplicable. Clearlyf Gallian1s 
letters in February also indicated that closing was dependent upon 
receipt by the escrow agent of the documents. 
III. An offer to sell real estate unsupported by con-
sideration may be withdrawn at any time before its acceptance. 
This withdrawal may be oral or in writing and may be implicit as 
well as expressed. 
IV. The letter of Mixon, as framed by Mixon and as 
understood by Mixon as well as Gallian, constitutes a rejection of 
the terms of the original offer and, thus, a counteroffer. The 
additional document requested by Mixon was not earlier requested 
by Appellants or their attorneys, and indeed, as interpreted by 
Appellants, required both the original of the substitution as well 
as a separate, independent document verifying the authenticity of 
the former. These documents were not in the possession of Respon-
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dents, nor could they genuinely come into their possession. 
V. Appellants did not discharge their obligations in 
good faith, and as such are not otherwise entitled to specific 
performance under Utah law. While good faith is implicit in every 
contract, when an offer is extended without consideration support-
ing the same, Appellants are required in good faith to timely 
accept, without qualification, Respondents1 offer, if they intend 
that Respondents be similarly bound. In this case, Appellant 
Crane's actions belie his integrity and should preclude him from 
prevailing on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL 
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT; 
THIS AFFIRMATION IS FURTHER COMPELLED BY AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF APPELLANT CRANE. 
Under Utah law, cases for specific performance have 
always required a greater degree of certainty in establishing the 
terms of an agreement than is necessary to establish a contract as 
the basis of an action at law for damages. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 
18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). Prior to July 1, 1985, 
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution specifically set 
forth a greater standard of review in equitable cases. See e.g.y 
Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Bown v. Loveland, 678 
P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). Under this standard, the Supreme Court did 
not reverse the trial court's judgment unless the evidence in the 
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case clearly preponderated against its findings. In Adams v. 
Gubler, 731 P. 2d 494 (Utah 1986), however, Justice Durham, speaking 
for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, noted that even though the 
former constitutional section had been redrafted, Rule 52(a), 
U.R.C.P., which became effective January 1, 1987, provides that 
findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous 
. . ." Id. at 496, n.3. Thus, regardless of whether the case is 
won in equity or won in law, Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. mandates that the 
factual finding of the trial court may be set aside on appeal only 
if they are clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548 
(Utah App. 1987); see also Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 
1987) . 
The second portion of Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. indicates that 
due regard "shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The credibility of 
Crane below, evident from the record and the recitation of facts 
supra should be duly noted by this Court. Indeed, Crane con-
tradicted the testimony of both his counsel. For exampler although 
Mixon testified repeatedly that he had been retained by Crane to 
get additional money from Respondents, Crane wholeheartedly denied 
this. (Mixon at 16, 30, 31, 32, 44, and 47) Indeed, Crane 
blithely testified at trial that Mixonfs sole purpose was to review 
the correctness of the exhibits and to confirm the substitution of 
guarantor. (Tl at 124) Further, Crane repeatedly denied telling 
Mixon that he was ever unhappy with the monetary terms of the 
offer. (Tl at 127, 129, 131, 137-8, 139, and 140) Additionally, 
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though Bishop spoke to Crane on the 13th day of February and 
testified that Crane had told him that the Respondents' offer had 
not been accepted, Crane stated that Bishop's understanding was 
wholly contrary to his (Crane's) state of mind. (Tl at 87-88; cf. 
Tl at 250) 
Not stopping at contradicting both of his attorneys, 
Crane's testimony, even in its unimportant particulars, directly 
contradicted the testimony of Russell Gallian. Gallian, for 
example, testified that, between the 13th day of November of 1984 
and the 22nd day of February 1985, he had no phone calls from 
Clifford Crane. (Tl at 260) On the other hand, Crane testified 
that he spoke with Gallian several times. On cross-examination, 
however, Crane could not even prove one such call through his phone 
records. (Tl at 125-36) This Court should remember that Crane did 
not simply fall off a pumpkin truck and land in Brian Head, Utah. 
Crane is a sophisticated businessman, having served as both a 
President and Vice-President of major communications concerns, some 
of them with more than 200 employees. (See Tl at 115-16.) Even 
in signing the original loan guarantee, marked as Exhibit P-6, 
Crane purposely signed his wife's name in a different color of ink 
because Crane presupposed this would make his "wife's" signature 
look more genuine to the lending bank. (Tl at 61, 172, 174) 
Crane's testimony throughout trial was continuously impeached, 
largely in part due to the integrity of his counsel, who were 
simply unwilling to change their testimony to fit that of their 
client. As Crane was clearly unbelievable under oath, to reverse 
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the trial court's decision at this time would wholly disregard the 
ability of the trial judge to discern and sift the truth of these 
matters from the large amount of testimony at trial. 
II. 
NO AGREEMENT WAS EVER TIMELY REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIE8; 
THE MAIL-BOX RULE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The Respondents' offer to Appellants in November of 1984 
was given without consideration. The facts abundantly demonstrate 
that Crane's reaction to the offer, when received, was dissatisfac-
tion with one or more of its material terms. Mixon testified that 
his sole purpose in contacting Gallian was to express Crane's 
dissatisfaction with the monetary terms and to get additional 
money. Furthermore, both Mixon and Gallian knew that absent the 
receipt of signed documents by Dixie Title the Cranes would not 
otherwise be bound by Respondents' proposal. (Mixon at 43-44; Tl 
at 261-62; see also Reporter's Transcript August 5, 1987, R 331 at 
20 [hereinafter T2].) Furthermore, Crane's suit for an accounting 
(Iron County Civil No. 85-066, filed February 12, 1985) clearly 
indicated Crane's intention to treat the proposal simply as an 
offer. (Tl at 86, 119-20; cf. P-10-A, P-ll-A; see also R 332 at 
3-4.) Indeed, as of February 13, 1985, Willard Bishop, Appellants' 
counsel, was totally unaware that there had even been an out-
standing offer to purchase Crane's interest. (Tl at 149) 
Point I of Appellants' brief alleges that the common law 
"mail-box rule" should be applied to this case, contrary to the 
finding entered by the trial court. The mail-box rule, in general 
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terms, is bottomed on the proposition that, in general, once an 
acceptance is deposited in the United States mail, the acceptance 
is deemed complete. This rule, however, is subject to a wide 
variety of exceptions, and, indeed, an offeror may restrict the 
manner of acceptance, provided his or her intention to do so is 
clearly expressed. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P. 2d 421 (Utah 1986) 
The first sentence in the penultimate paragraph of 77 Am. Jur. 2d 
"Vendor and Purchaser" § 22 is dispositive in the instant case. 
Therein the authors clearly set forth the principle as follows: 
Whether a contract is consummated by the 
posting of a letter accepting an offer is 
dependent upon whether acceptance by mail was 
authorized. (Id., emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the trial court found that accep-
tance by simply depositing the documents in the mail was not 
authorized by the offeror. The only issue before the Supreme 
Court, therefore, is whether there is any factual basis in the 
evidence to support this ruling. Both P-8 and P-9 expressly 
indicate that the assignment of the Cranes' interest in the limited 
partnerships "shall be deposited with escrow agent to be delivered 
to buyer upon closing." (See P-8, P-9; cf. P-16, P-17.) Further-
more, in Gallian's letter to Mixon dated February 11, 1985, he 
clearly states his understanding as follows: 
Upon receipt the Escrow Agent will disburse 
$175,000.00 to your clients and Barry Church 
will execute a warranty deed on behalf of the 
Partnership for the condo. (P-12) 
In P-13, Gallian's letter to Bishop, dated February 11, 
1985, Gallian once again indicated that both he and Mr. Church were 
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"now awaiting documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title 
Company, at which time the closing will be completed and Mr. Crane 
will no longer be associated with Timberbrook." (P-13) 
Ultimately, Crane's testimony becomes the most signifi-
cant argument to sustain the Judge's ruling. On cross examination 
Crane testified as follows: 
Q [Read] [t]he second page of both P--8 
and the second page of P-9, second to last 
sentence. 
A Okay. "The assignment, Exhibit A, 
shall be deposited with escrow agent to be 
delivered to buyer upon closing." 
Q And you understood who that escrow 
agent was? 
A Dixie Title. 
Q And you had to deposit these docu-
ments with them, because it's stated on the 
documents, isn't it? 
A Yes. (Tl at 151) 
On February 22, 1985, Crane indicates that he expressly 
told Gallian that the documents "were all signed and in escrow." 
(Tl at 160) In point of fact, however, Crane conceded this was 
really simply an assumption. (Tl at 163) The trial court found, 
based upon P-19-A and the other evidence before it, that the 
documents indeed had not been placed in escrow as of the morning 
of February 22, 1985. (Finding of Fact No. 16) As both parties 
understood that Crane's acceptance was dependent upon the actual 
deposit of documents with escrow, and as there is evidence to 
support this conclusion of the trial court, the argument that 
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simple posting of the documents was sufficient cannot be sustained. 
Under basic contract theory, a contract generally arises 
"from the time that the agent of the offeree communicates the 
acceptance of his principle to the offeror." See Restatement of 
Contracts, § 64, Illustration 2. Indeed, the offeror, in this case 
Respondents, can specify the way in which the offer can be 
accepted, and an acceptance in any other way is a counteroffer. 
See Restatement of Contracts, §61, Comment a at 67; see also 
Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971). 
In terms of the acceptance in the instant case, both 
parties understood that acceptance required the actual deposit of 
documents with the escrow agent. The trial court found that this 
event had not occurred on the morning of February 22, 1985. This 
conclusion is abundantly sustainable, but pursuant to Rule 52, 
U.R.C.P. and the case law cited in Section I, supra, Respondent 
need only provide enough evidence that the ruling is not otherwise 
clearly erroneous. Respondents strenuously urge that this portion 
of the trial court's judgment be sustained. 
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III. 
RESPONDENTS' OFFER WAS EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN 
ON FEBRUARY 22, 1985. 
Gallian's testimony and the facts and circumstances 
relevant to his conversation with Crane on the morning of February 
22, 1985, have been set forth above. The trial court, however, was 
initially concerned whether an offer for the sale of real estate 
could, without more, be orally withdrawn. The trial court con-
cluded in the affirmative based upon the clear weight of authority 
in favor of this proposition. 
The initial offer from Respondents to Appellants was 
without any consideration. As such, the offeror can withdraw that 
offer any time before its timely acceptance by the offeree accord-
ing to the terms as set forth in the offer. See 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
"Contracts11 § 36; see also Simpson on Contracts 2d "Offer and 
Acceptance" Ch. 2, § 25. In 91 C.J.S. "Vendor and Purchaser" § 
28(b), the authors note that no formal notice of revocation is 
necessary, and, even were knowledge, for example, of a subsequent 
sale of the property to indirectly come to the actual knowledge of 
the prior offeree, this alone would constitute a revocation of the 
prior offer. See also 17 C.J.S. "Contracts" § 50(d); Wiliston on 
Contracts § 55. 
In the case at bar, Gallian clearly advised Crane on 
February 22, 1985, that Respondents1 offer had been withdrawn. 
The trial court found that at the time this notice was cfiven Crane 
had still not performed pursuant to the terms of the offer and, 
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indeed, pursuant to Crane's own understanding of those terms. 
The fact that the revocation of the offer need not be in 
writing was clearly brought to light by a recent Arizona decision, 
Allen R. Krauss Co. v. Fox, 132 Ariz. 125, 644 P.2d 279 (Ariz. App. 
1982). In Fox, the plaintiff tendered a written offer to purchase 
Fox's land for $265,000.00 on May 27, 1981. On May 29, Fox 
responded counterproposing a purchase price for $486,000.00, and 
requiring acceptance by 6:00 p.m. the following day, to-wit: May 
30, 1981. Further negotiations ensued finally resulting in Fox 
delivering to Krauss a second counteroffer agreeing to the initial 
purchase price of $265,000.00, but reducing the brokerage commis-
sion. Acceptance of Fox's second counteroffer was required by 5:00 
p.m. on June 3. At 3:00 in the afternoon on June 3, Fox's real 
estate agent, Mr. Riley, advised Krauss's agent, Mr. Carson, that 
Fox "was pulling her property off the market or she just didn't 
want to sell it . . ." (644 P. 2d 280) Thereafter, Krauss, the 
offeree, immediately executed and delivered his acceptance of the 
second counteroffer at the title company at 4:15 p.m., 45 minutes 
before the 5:00 p.m. June 3 deadline. The Arizona appellate court 
unanimously ruled that the counteroffer of the landowner Fox had 
been validly withdrawn. The language of the court's opinion states 
the law which Respondents feel is applicable to the instant case: 
Because the counteroffer was not given 
for consideration, and even though it was 
specified for a definite period, it could be 
revoked at any time before acceptance. See 
Butler v. Wehrley, 5 Ariz. App. 228, 429 P.2d 
130 (1967) (where revocation was not validly 
communicated and was therefore ineffective); 
1 Wiliston on Contracts § 55 "Revocation" (3rd 
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ed. 1957). The written counteroffer was 
orally revoked at 3:00, which was before 
acceptance, by delivery of the executed accep-
tance to the escrow agent at 4:15 p.m. There-
fore, no contract was created. Restatement 
[2d] "Contracts" § 36 (644 P.2d at 280) 
Similarly, in the instant case, Gallian unequivocally and validly 
withdrew Respondents1 offer prior to its acceptance by Appellants 
through the depositing of documents with the escrow agent. 
IV, 
APPELLANTS' ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONDENTS' OFFER 
WAS CONDITIONAL AND CONSTITUTED LITTLE MORE 
THAN A COUNTEROFFER. 
In general, M[t]o create a binding contract the 
acceptance must unconditionally agree to all the material provi-
sions of the offer, and must not add any new material conditions 
. . ." See R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 
817 (1952); see also Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 
903 at 906 (1961) . 
In the instant case, Appellants indicate that their 
acceptance of Respondents' offer was unconditional. While Respon-
dents concede that some of the so-called conditions of Mixonfs 
letter (P-18) may have been implied in the context of the parties1 
negotiations, other conditions were indeed material and constituted 
little more than a counteroffer. 
Gallian testified that on the 8th day of February 1985 
that he spoke with Crane's attorney, Mr. Mixon, in California. In 
this conversation Mixon requested a copy of the substitution of 
guarantor document and questioned the authenticity of the same. 
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Gallian testified that he verified the same as a fellow practi-
tioner. (Tl at 270-71, 284-86) Gallian further testified that on 
February 8 he understood that his personal verification of the 
authenticity of the substitution of guarantor document would be 
sufficient. Three days later, on February 11, 1985, Gallian 
drafted and signed P-12. Its careful wording is exemplary of 
Gallian's understanding of this earlier conversation with Mixon: 
Enclosed is a copy of the initial Substitution 
of Guarantor which I certify was executed by 
myself and Mr. Dewey Crouch, Vice-President of 
Nebraska Savings and Loan. (P-12) 
In response thereto, Mixon1s letter, mailed February 21, expressly 
instructed the escrow agent that Gallian's verification of the 
authenticity of the Substitution of Guarantor document was clearly 
not sufficient to Appellants. Indeed, Mixon testified that without 
a separate document from Nebraska Savings and Loan verifying the 
authenticity of the Substitution of Guarantor document it was not 
Mixon's intent that the deal close. (Mixon D-29 at 37) Mixon 
fully knew that his cover letter, as read by an escrow agent, would 
be firm in this matter. (Id. at 22-24) Even Crane admitted at 
trial that without verification, independent of Gallian's, as to 
the authenticity of that document, Crane did not intend to go ahead 
with the transaction. (Tl at 149) 
Importantly, the original of the loan substitution 
document was in the offices of Nebraska Savings and Loan and, 
indeed, was never received pursuant to Mixonfs instructions. (Tl 
at 96, 258) Furthermore, at trial, Crane not only conceded that 
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Mixon had made it necessary for Gallian to obtain this extra 
verification document, but Crane further indicated that he [Crane] 
understood that Gallian was additionally required to obtain for 
Crane the original substitution document itself. (Tl at 144-46) 
As a corollary thereto, Gallian testified that, having once 
personally verified the authenticity of the document, he would not 
have procured a second verification and could not obtain the 
original substitution as expressly requested by Mixon as a condi-
tion to closing. (Tl at 285-86) 
Beyond imposing this additional condition, which, by 
reason of the negotiations, was contrary to the understanding of 
Respondents, the trial court expressly found that the cover letter 
of Mixon had not made the acceptance unconditional. (Finding of 
Fact No. 19) 
Though not expressly a portion of the trial court's 
opinion, it becomes clear from an examination of the record that 
prior to the posting of Mixonfs letter on February 21, one addi-
tional factor had been set forth by Respondents as a condition to 
Appellants1 acceptance of Respondents' offer. On February 11, 
1985, Gallian drafted P-13, a letter to Bishop indicating that his 
request on Crane's behalf for an accounting on Timberbrook should 
be moot in the event Crane sold his partnership interest in 
Timberbrook. This letter was copied to Mr. Mixon, California 
counsel for Clifford Crane. (P-13) Having not received the 
letter, Bishop filed Civil No. 85-066 on February 12, 1985, and 
received Gallian's letter (P-13) a day latter on February 13, when 
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Barry Church was served. On the 15th of February, Gallian and 
Bishop spoke, and Bishop wrote a letter confirming that conversa-
tion, indicating that the offer of Respondents to purchase Appel-
lants1 interest in the partnership had not yet been accepted as a 
settlement offer on the accounting lawsuit, and that until Appel-
lant did in fact accept that settlement offer, Bishop had been 
instructed to proceed with the lawsuit. This letter from Bishop's 
office (P-15-A) was also copied to Appellants in California. Thus, 
both Gallian and Bishop understood that a condition to the purchase 
of Appellants1 interest was the termination of the accounting suit. 
Absent the termination of that suit, Respondents felt no duty to 
close. (T2 at 27) 
While the Appellant Clifford Crane conceded that, had he 
received the money and the deed, he would have dismissed the 
accounting suit, he conceded on cross-examination from Respondents1 
counsel that he "may not have11 communicated this information to Mr. 
Gallian. (T2 at 43-44) Gallian firmly testified that he never 
heard one word about the accounting suit being dismissed as part 
of the closing from Mr. Crane. (T2 at 4 6) 
Prior to the acceptance of an offer, the offeror may 
modify the terms of the acceptance at any time. Appellants1 
counsel, Bishop, indicated that Crane had not accepted the settle-
ment offer on February 18, 1985. (P-15-A) This letter, copied to 
Crane, set forth the materiality of that dismissal to the un-
qualified acceptance of Respondents1 offer. Appellants, however, 
maintained civil no. 85-066 up to and including the time of trial. 
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Appellants' failure to communicate that, as a portion of 
the acceptance, the accounting suit would be dismissed is a 
material failure in unequivocally accepting Respondents1 offer as 
that offer became modified after notice of the lawsuit reached 
Respondents. Crane's testimony, uncommunicated to the offeror, 
that he would have dismissed the lawsuit is wholly ineffective. 
What Crane would have done, simply stated, is not enough. The 
acceptance of this condition was material to the offer as it stood 
on February 21, 1985, when Mixon mailed P-18 with its enclosures. 
Nothing in that letter, however, expresses to the escrow agent that 
the accounting suit, filed eight days prior to its mailing, would 
ever be dismissed, and a copy of Mixon's letter (P-18), in point 
of fact, was never mailed to Gallian. 
V. 
EQUITY COMPELLED THAT APPELLANTS 
NOT PREVAIL IN THE INSTANT SUIT. 
The general rule in Utah is that equity reserves its 
rewards for those who are themselves acting in fairness and good 
conscience, or, in other words, to those who have come into court 
with clean hands. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). 
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, indicated 
that all parties to a proposed contract "are obliged to proceed in 
good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance 
with its expressed intent." Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1979) . In reviewing the entirety of the pleadings and the tes-
timony before the trial court, it becomes clear that Mixon was 
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retained simply to get more money than what Crane in principle had 
agreed to accept. Even Mixon admitted that Crane had initially 
agreed to sell for $175,000.00. (Mixon at 31) Crane admits to 
this oral agreement as well, but retained Mixon solely for the 
purpose of getting more money. (See Tl at 63, 69.) 
Simultaneous to Mixon's first conversation with Gallian 
on January 4, Crane also retained Bishop, who, not knowing of the 
offer to purchase Crane's interest, proceeded diligently to obtain 
an accounting of the Timberbrook partnership, finally resulting in 
the filing of a lawsuit on February 12, 1985. While the filing of 
the lawsuit alone is not an example of bad faith, the timing of 
this lawsuit, coupled with the fact that Bishop, Crane's Utah 
attorney, had no prior knowledge of the ongoing negotiations to 
purchase Crane's interest in Timberbrook, created a situation which 
put Respondents between the proverbial "rock and a hard spot." In 
effect, Crane was attempting to negotiate an increase in the money 
offered by becoming a proverbial "thorn in the side" of the 
partnership. Indeed, Respondents have urged that the maintaining 
of this suit alone constitutes an implied and continuing rejection 
of Respondents' offer. Bishop himself conceded that he knew 
nothing of the ongoing negotiations to purchase Crane's interest 
until receiving Gallian's letter on February 13, 1985. (Tl at 248-
51.) 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondents suggest to the 
Court that though the trial court made no finding from the evidence 
before it, the actions of Crane clearly indicate a continuing 
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unwillingness to be bound by the proposal offered by Gallian. (R 
332 at 4-6) Respondents suggest that Crane's masked or veiled 
intentions, his lack of credibility, and the fact that his tes-
timony was largely impeached by both of his counsel, indicate that 
he did not go before the trial court with clean hands and does not, 
apart from his counsel, stand with clean hands before this Court.-
As Respondents' counsel has previously indicated, Appellants's 
counsel have acted with full integrity throughout this case. 
Appellant, however, standing alone, does not qualify to receive 
equity and obtain a decree of specific performance under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment entered by the trial court, The Honorable 
J. Philip Eves presiding, should be affirmed. Having accurately 
assessed the credibility of the witnesses before itir the trial 
court's findings are amply supported by the record on appeal; they 
should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Appellant has not 
overcome this burden. 
The testimony before the trial court clearly sustains a 
valid and timely revocation of Respondents' initial offer to 
purchase Appellant Crane's interest in Timberbrook. Acceptance 
required the physical tender of documents to escrow, which act had 
not been accomplished due to Appellants' own delay in responding 
to the offer. 
Beyond the above, Appellants' ultimate response proposed 
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the necessity of additional conditions as a precedent to closing 
and, thus, constituted a counteroffer. Lastly, by reason of the 
ambivalent and duplicitous actions of Appellant Crane, Utah law 
would preclude his requested recovery for specific performance. 
Respectfully submitted this ay of June, 1988. 
^ / / l ^ / 
MrCHAEL D. HUGHES, OF 
THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four full, true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF ON APPEAL was placed 
in the United States mail at St. George, Utah', with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid on the / / vC-day of June, 1988, 
addressed as follows: 
Willard R. Bishop 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and 
BONNIE CRANE, husband and 
wife. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ) Civil No. 85-281 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE LIMITED, 
a Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART MARKETING AND 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, in its capacity 
as general partner of 
Timberbrook Village Limited; 
LEISURE SPORTS, INCORPORATED, 
a Utah Corporation; and 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, DISTRICT JUDGE 
August 5, 19 87 
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APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs: BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
By: WILLARD R. BISHOP, Esq. 
36 North 300 West 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
For the Defendants: THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER 
Attorneys at Law 
By: MICHAEL D. HUGHES, Esq. 
148 East Tabernacle Street 
St. George, Utah 8477 0 
1 PAROWAN, IRON COUNTY, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1987 
2 12:02 p.m. 
3 I -oOo-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We are back in session. Itfs two 
minutes after twelve noon. The parties are present with 
their counsel. 
I have reviewed the exhibits which were 
10 I admitted in the trial as well as the law which has been 
11 supplied by the parties. I make the following findings 
12 of fact. 
13 On November 13th, 19 85 the parties had an 
14 oral agreement in principle which was to be reduced to 
15 writing, signed and deposited in escrow, along with 
16 other items, to complete the transaction and thus the 
17 agreement. Those items were to include money, release 
18 from a construction loan, a deed and assignment. Some 
19 of those items had not been discussed nor settled in the 
20 oral agreement. On November 20th, 19 85 money was placed 
21 in escrow and a release occurred, but that was not placed 
22 in escrow and was not communicated to Crane. 
23 Nothing more of significance happened until 
24 January of 19 85 when Mr. Bishop was retained to obtain 
25 an accounting by Mr. Crane, and he notified Mr. Gallian 
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and others of his — of that intent by 
January and early in February. I find 
letter both in 
that that action 
indicates that Mr. Crane did not feel that he had a 
binding agreement at that time, but was in the position 
of being in receipt of an offer which he was either free 
to accept or reject. 
On February 11th, 1985 Mr. Gallian sent a 
letter to Mr. Mixon redefining the terms of the 
agreement, including Crane!s transfer c 
to Leisure Sports and the five percent 
and the statement that the escrow agent 
f the 20 percent 
to Timberbrook, 
would then 
disburse $17 5,000 to Crane and Church would execute a 
warranty deed for the condo. 
Also on February 11th, 1985 Mr. Gallian 
sent a letter to Mr. Bishop explaining 
Mixon and reaffirming the existence of 
his contact with 
the terms of the 
offer, and stated that the accounting problem appeared to 
have been solved by Crane's inspection of the books. He 
again asks that the documents which were outstanding be 
placed in escrow to complete the formation of the contract 
and "the deal," as he calls it. 
On February 13th, 19 85 Mr. 
Mr. Bishop that he had not yet accepted 
offer; that he wanted to go ahead with 
On the same date, Mr. Crane signed the 
Crane told 
I the outstanding 
the accounting. 
outstanding 
1 agreements and deposited them with Mr. Mixon, his attorney 
2 in California. 
3 On February 12th, 19 85 the accounting 
4 lawsuit was filed by Mr. Bishop. I note that that had 
5 been completed by Mr. Bishop in preparation for filing on 
6 February the 6th, 19 85. 
7 On February the 15th, 1985 Mr. Gallian and 
8 Mr. Bishop spoke on the telephone after Mr. Gallian 
9 learned of the existence of the lawsuit. During that 
10 discussion the terms of the agreement were still 
11 outstanding and were not revoked. 
12 On February the 18th, 1985 Mr. Gallian and 
13 Mr. Church met and decided the deal was off, but at that 
14 time did not communicate their decision to anyone. On 
15 February the 18th, 1985 Mr. Bishop sent letters to 
16 Mr. — or sent a letter to Mr. Gallian stating Crane's 
17 position of February 13th, 1985. Also on February 18th, 
18 1985 Mr. Mixon dictated the letter which was mailed on 
19 February 21, 19 85 with which he sent the signed agreements 
20 which he had been given by Mr. Crane for deposit in 
21 escrow, and also with which he sent a letter stating 
22 conditions and documents that he felt were necessary prior 
23 to the closing of the escrow. 
24 On February 22nd, 19 85 Mr. Crane called 
25 Mr. Gallian, and I believe that he was told at that time 
1 that the deal was off. As it turns out, however, and as 
2 you will find in a few minutes, it doesnft really make 
3 any difference whether he was told that on the 22nd or 
4 the 27th. He also called Mr. Westbrook and Nebraska to 
5 determine the status of the release from the construction 
6 loan and the escrow file. 
7 Based on the testimony of Mr. Westbrook, 
8 Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as well as the postmark on 
9 the Mixon letter, I find that the acceptance of the sale 
10 terms had not reached the escrow on the morning of 
11 February 22nd, 1985, but arrived after Mr. Crane had been 
12 told, as had Mr. Westbrook, that the deal was off. 
13 Throughout the communications leading up to 
14 February 22nd, 19 85 Mr. Crane considered the sales 
15 agreement documents merely an offer which he was free to 
16 accept or reject, and not a memorialization of a binding 
17 agreement. That is evidenced by his own actions and his 
18 communications to his attorneys and their communications 
19 to Mr. Gallian. 
20 Mr. Gallian, as representative of 
21 Timberbrook, considered the status or the posture of the 
22 matter in the same way in that he felt that the oral 
23 agreements, if any, were unenforceable and that what was 
24 outstanding was an offer which Mr. Crane could accept or 
25 reject. 
Finally, I find that Mixon's letter of 
February 18th, 1985, which accompanied the two sales 
agreements which were deposited in escrow, was a 
conditional acceptance of the outstanding offer, and in 
fact created a counteroffer requiring Timberbrook to 
supply a new document not previously part of the offer, 
that document being a verification of the authenticity 
of the release from the construction loan. 
The conclusions of law I draw from that 
are these: 
One, that first of all, whether both parties 
intended that an offer and acceptance, I don't think the 
law can assume that they had a completed oral agreement, 
and in this case they both did clearly understand that 
there was an offer outstanding which Mr. Crane could 
accept or reject. 
Secondly, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving the terms of the agreement and the formation of 
the contract, and in this case the plaintiff has failed 
to carry that burden. 
Third, this quote, "agreement," unquote, 
actually constituted an offer without consideration and 
was not revocable — not irrevocable and could not be 
revoked at any time prior to proper acceptance by 
Mr. Crane. "Proper acceptance" under these circumstances 
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was the deposit of the signed agreements in escrow. 
Fourth, the oral revocation of the agreement 
was communicated to Mr. Crane prior to his acceptance of 
the offer or attempting to accept the offer by placing 
the signed agreements in escrow or by communicating his 
acceptance to the offerer. 
Five, the receipt of the signed documents 
in escrow after Crane was informed by Gallian that the 
deal was off did not create an enforceable contract, and 
especially in light of the additional condition imposed 
on the closing by Mr. Mixon's letter, but instead 
constituted a counteroffer conditioned upon Timberbrook' s 
supplying the verification previously mentioned. 
Sixth, no enforceable contract was created 
under these facts because the offer was revoked prior 
to its unequivocal acceptance, and the purported 
acceptance was in fact a counteroffer which was never 
accepted. 
Therefore, judgment for the defendants and 
against the plaintiff. No cause of action. 
Mr. Hughes, will you prepare appropriate 
findings of fact — 
MR. HUGHES: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — and conclusions of law and 
judgment? 
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MR. BISHOP: Mike, are you going to order 
copy of the ruling? 
MR. HUGHES: Yes. 
MR. BISHOP: If he will, I would like a 
copy. 
THE COURT: Anything further to take place 
in this matter? 
MR. BISHOP: No, your Honor. 
MR. HUGHES: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: We are in recess in this 
matter. 
(The proceedings were recessed.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD G. CRANE and BONNIE 
CRANE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TIMBERBROOK VILLAGE, LTD., a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
HEART iMARKETING and DEVELOP- ' 
MENT, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, in its capacity as 
general partner of TIMBERBROOK 
VILLAGE, LTD.: LEISURE SPORTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and [ 
DIXIE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah y 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
) FINDINGS OF 
) CONCLUSIONS 
1 Civil No. 
FACT AND 
OF LAW 
85-281 
THIS MATTER having come on for trial on the 4th 
and 5th of August, 1987, and the Plaintiffs, Clifford G. 
Crane and Bonnie Crane, having been represented by their 
attorney of record, Willard R. Bishop, and the Defendants 
collectively represented by their counsel of record, Michael 
D. Hughes, and the Court having heard the testimony of the 
witnesses, having received the evidentiary support, both of 
the Plaintifffs complaint and the defenses proposed by 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST COURT 
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S E P y 1987 
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Defendants, and the matter having been submitted upon oral 
argument by both counsel, 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court hereby enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the pleadings were 
properly joined for trial. 
2. The Court finds that Clifford G. Crane had 
purchased a 25% interest in Timberbrook Village, Ltd., a 
Utah limited partnership, with its principal, place of 
business in Iron County, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that Leisure Sports, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, together with Heart Marketing and 
Development, Inc., a general partner of Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd., desired to repurchase the interest of Clifford Crane 
in said partnership. 
4. The Court finds that as of November 13th, 
1985, Plaintiffs and these Defendants had reached in 
principle an oral agreement which was to be reduced in 
writing, signed by the Plaintiffs, deposited by the 
Plaintiffs at Dixie Title Company, along with assignments of 
their partnership interests, and that these requirements 
were necessary to complete the transaction. 
5. The Court finds that some but not all of the 
items had been discussed and settled in the oral agreement, 
but that they included, among other things, transfer of 
money, release of the Plaintiffs from the guarantee of a 
construction loan, preparation of a deed by the Defendants, 
and the preparation and completion of two assignments by the 
Plaintiffs. 
6. The Court finds that on November 20th, 1985, 
the Defendants, Leisure Sports, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., caused to be 
placed in escrow $175,000 in reliance upon their belief that 
a deal had been struck and that, further, Leisure Sports, 
Inc., by and through Mr. Russell Gallian, one of its 
principals, obtained release of the Plaintiffs from the 
construction loan. The Court finds, however, that said 
release was not placed in escrow at this time and was not 
communicated to the Plaintiffs. 
7. The Court finds that on November 13th, 1984, 
Russell Gallian, on behalf of Leisure Sports, Inc., and 
Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., did enclose documents 
requesting their execution and delivery to Dixie Title 
Company to the Plaintiffs Clifford Crane and Bonnie Crane. 
These documents were marked at trial as P-7, P-8, and P-9, 
respectively, and were received into evidence. 
8. The Court finds that nothing more of 
significance happened until January of 1985, when the 
Defendant Clifford Crane, acting through his attorney, Dean 
Mixon, contacted Mr. Bishop, an attorney in Cedar City, 
Utah, and retained Mr. Bishop for the purposes of obtaining 
an accounting on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. The Court finds 
that Crane's action in retaining both Mixon and Bishop 
evidences Crane's feeling there was no binding agreement at 
the time, but that he was in a position of being in receipt 
of an offer regarding which he was either free to accept or 
reject. 
9. The Court finds from the evidence that the 
thrust of Mixon's conversations with Gallian were to 
increase the amount of money to be paid Plaintiffs, but that 
in February of 1985, Mixon expressed a concern over the 
releasing of the Plaintiffs from a loan guarantee which had 
heretofore been a part of the parties1 negotiations. The 
Court finds that by Exhibit P-13, Mr. Russell Gallian 
forwarded to the offices of Mr. Mixon a copy of a 
substitution of guarantor, by the text of which the 
Plaintiffs were both released from any loan guarantees 
related to the Timberbrook Village, Ltd. partnership. The 
Court further finds that the original of such substitution 
was retained by the bank. The Court finds that by P-12, the 
Defendants Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and 
Leisure Sports, Inc., once again renewed their offer for 
Crane to execute Exhibits P-8 and P-9 and return the same to 
the Defendant Dixie Title Company so that escrow could be 
completed. In this letter, Gallian once again redefined the 
terms on behalf of these Defendants, of what he understood 
the agreement to be, including transfer of the 20% to 
Leisure Sports and the 5% to Timberbrook. Gallian further 
stated in such letter that the escrow agent would then 
disburse $175,000 to the Plaintiffs and that Barry Church, 
an« 
on behalf of Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a 
general partner to Timberbrook Village, Ltd., would then 
execute a warranty deed for the condominium which was 
additional consideration in the transaction. 
10. The Court finds that simultaneous with the 
transfer of the letter to Mixon, Gallian, by way of P-13, 
wrote a letter to Mr. Willard R. Bishop explaining the 
contact of the Defendants with Mixon, Cranes1 California 
attorney, and reaffirming to Bishop the existence of the 
terms of the offer. Gallian further stated his belief that 
the accounting problems appeared to have been solved by 
Crane's prior inspection of the books and, once again, the 
question indicated that these Defendants were awaiting 
documents to be placed in escrow at Dixie Title Co. , at 
which time the closing would be completed and the accounting 
problems resolved. 
11. The Court finds that on February 12th, 1985, 
the lawsuit was filed for an accounting against Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., and Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, and that on February 13th, Mr. Barry 
Church, as a principal of Heart Marketing and Development, 
Inc., was served with the complaint in said lawsuit. The 
Court finds that on February 13th, Mr. Crane advised Mr. 
Bishop, his Utah counsel, that he had not accepted the 
outstanding offer made to him by the Defendants, Heart 
Marketing and Development, Inc. and Leisure Sports, Inc., 
and that Crane desired to proceed with an accounting until 
the settlement was of fered. Crane did not in fact ever 
accept it. The Court finds that the thrust of this 
information^relayed to Gallian orally by conversation on the 
15th day of February, 1985, and reconfirmed by a letter 
received as Exhibit P-15 over the signature of Willard R. 
Bishop, dated February 18th, 1985. 
12. The Court finds that February 13th, fiSS, %\ 
Plaintiffs executed P-8 and P-9, deposited said exhibits 
with Mr. Mixon, Plaintiffs1 attorney in California. The 
Court finds, however, that such information was not conveyed 
to Mr. Bishop, Plaintiffs1 attorney in Utah. The Court 
finds that by reason of the same, Bishop advised Gallian on 
February 15th, 1985, that Crane had not yet accepted the 
offer based upon Crane's February 13th conversation with 
Bishop, but that during that discussion, terms of the offer 
were still outstanding and had not yet been revoked. 
13. The Court finds that on the same day that Mr. 
Bishop sent his letter, Exhibit P-15, to Mr. Gallian, that 
Gallian and Church met on behalf of Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd, Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and Leisure 
Sports, Inc., and decided that the deal was off. This 
decision, however, was not then communicated to anyone. The 
Court finds that while Mixon dictated a letter on February 
18th, 1985, said letter was not mailed until the afternoon 
of February 21st, 1985, as per the postmarked envelope which 
had been received into evidence. In this letter, sending 
Exhibits P-7 and P-8, Mixon also stated certain conditions, 
including additional documents which were to be received, 
which Mixon stated were necessary prerequisites to the 
closing of escrow. 
14. The Court finds that on the morning of 
February 22nd, 1985, Mr. Crane called Mr. Gallian and the 
Court finds that in the first portion of that conversation, 
Gallian advised Crane that the deal was off. 
15. The Court also finds that subsequent to this 
conversation with Gallian, Crane phoned the bank in Nebraska 
to determine the status of the release of the Plaintiffs 
from the construction loan and called Mr. Westbrook of Dixie 
Title to determine the status of the escrow. 
16. The Court finds, basing its finding on the 
testimony of Mr. Westbrook, Mr. Crane, and Mr. Gallian, as 
well as the postmark on the Mixon letter, that the title 
company had not received Plaintiffs1 acceptance as per the 
terms of the agreement on the morning of February 22nd, 
1985. The Court finds that the agreement states, as do the 
cover letters of Gallian, said agreements were to be 
executed and delivered by the Plaintiffs in escrow to 
complete their end of the transaction. The Court finds that 
this event had not occurred when Mr. Crane had been told, as 
had Mr. Westbrook, by Mr. Gallian that the deal was off. 
17. The Court finds that up through and including 
the date of February 22nd, 1985, the Plaintiffs considered 
sales agreement documents P-8 and P-9 merely as an offer 
which he free to accept or reject, not a memorialization of 
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an agreement binding upon him. This finding is evidenced by 
the actions of the Plaintiffs and the communications of Mr. 
Crane to his attorneys, Mr. Mixon and Mr. Bishop, and their 
communications to Mr. Gallian on behalf of Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., Heart Marketing and Development, Inc., and 
Leisure Sports, Inc. 
18. The Court further finds that Mr. Gallian, as 
a representative of these Defendants, considered the status 
of the parties1 dealings in the same posture, to-wit, that 
the oral agreement, if any, was tenuous and unenforceable, 
and that what was outstanding was an offer that Crane was 
considering, but could accept or reject. 
19. The Court further finds that the letter of 
Dean Mixon of February 18th, 1985, which accompanied 
Exhibits P-8 and P-9, and deposited in escrow, in fact, only 
conditionally accepted the outstanding offer and requiring 
that Defendants submit yet additional documents into escrow. 
As a result, the Court finds that Mixonfs cover letter on 
behalf of Plaintiffs created a counteroffer requiring the 
Defendants to supply a new document not previously part of 
the offer, that document being a verification of the 
authenticity of the release of the Plaintiffs from the 
construction loan on Timberbrook Village, Ltd. 
20. The Court further finds that at the close of 
evidence, the Plaintiffs moved that Defendants' counterclaim 
be dismissed and that the Defendants so stipulate. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court hereby concludes as follows: 
1. The Court concludes that both parties dealt 
with this transaction on the basis of an outstanding offer 
which required acceptance by the Plaintiffs. As a result", 
while the Court concludes that Gallian believed an oral 
agreement had been reached, the terms of the same remained 
subject to the Plaintiffs1 acceptance and the Court 
specifically concludes that both parties understood there 
was an offer outstanding which Crane could either accept or 
reject. 
2. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff seeking 
specific performance, has the burden of proving in a clear 
and convincing manner the terms of the agreement and the 
formation of the contract, and in this case, the Court 
concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to carry that 
burden. 
3. The Court further concludes that P-8 and P-9 
were indeed offers open to the Plaintiffs1 acceptance 
without consideration, and, thus, could be revoked at any 
time prior to proper acceptance by the Plaintiffs. The 
Court finds that proper acceptance under these circumstances 
called for the deposit of Exhibits P-8 and P-9 executed by 
the Plaintiffs, in escrow at Dixie Title Company in St. 
George, Utah. 
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4. The Court concludes that the Defendants orally 
revoked their offer to Crane and communicated the same to 
the Plaintiffs prior to their acceptance of the offer and 
prior to any communication called for by the agreement or 
otherwise, by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants that their 
offer had, in fact, been accepted. The Court finds that 
thet subsequent receipt of P-8 and P-9 in escrow after such 
oral revocation of the offer, did not thereafter create an 
enforceable contract; this is so especially in light of the 
Court's conclusion that Mixon's cover letter, received as 
P-18, imposed an additional condition upon the closing and 
thus constituted a counteroffer conditioning Plaintiffs1 
acceptance of Defendants1 offer upon Timberbrook Village, 
Ltd., supplying separate verification of the substitution of 
guarantor document previously mentioned. The Court finds 
that there was no enforceable contract created under these 
facts because the offer was properly revoked prior to its 
unequivocal acceptance and that the purported acceptance 
thereafter received by Defendant Dixie Title Company, was in 
fact a counteroffer which was never accepted, and that the 
Defendants never reinstated their offer. 
5. The Court concludes that the Defendants 
counterclaimed on the basis of Plaintiffs1 motion and 
Defendants' acquiescence in the same should be dismissed. 
6. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 case as 
against Defendants should also be dismissed with prejudice 
on the basis of the aforementioned Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; no cause of action. 
DATED this _^_f>day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
J J 'PHILIP SyES 
district Court Judge 
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